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ABSTRACT 
 
Large hydropower projects have long been political flashpoints where environmental, economic 
and social considerations have vied for priority. Historically, economic benefits of large 
hydropower projects have been assumed to outweigh the costs, a rationale which catalyzed the 
construction of large hydropower dams around the world with little regard for their socio-
environmental externalities.  
 
Brazil is still in a semi-developmental stage and accordingly perceives a higher demand for large 
hydropower projects and infrastructure. While hydropower can bring immense benefits to 
Brazil’s energy infrastructure, Belo Monte’s location in the Amazon presents serious socio-
environmental concerns that are straining Brazil’s legal and regulatory regimes. After a period of 
explosive growth in dam construction, the United States is now shifting into a period of dam 
removal and decommission. This is partly due to increased awareness regarding the 
environmental and social impacts of dams, but made possible by the well-established cadre of 
statues, regulatory agencies, and advocacy groups with the power to drive meaningful change. 
The accountability and flexibility built into legal and regulatory frameworks in the United States 
have enabled the law to adapt and overcome deficiencies in addressing externalities surrounding 
hydropower development. 
 
Public participation has evolved into a key element underlying any policy-based approach to 
conservation, natural resources management, or application of modern environmental law. The 
distinction between public participation that is “meaningful” as opposed to public participation 
that is merely “due” under the law will only become more relevant as the social, environmental 
and economic externalities imposed by hydropower projects become a larger consideration in 
regulatory law and policy. Examining this distinction through case studies in the United States 
and Brazil offers an increasingly relevant perspective on public participation’s role in addressing 
hydropower externalities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Throughout history, the hydrologic characteristics of water have been key drivers in 
shaping not only ecological and geographic landscapes, but the social and cultural bedrock of 
civilizations. Dams represent an extension of human influence over the environment; molding 
natural resources into drivers of economic growth and prosperity. Large hydropower projects 
have long been political flashpoints where environmental, economic and social considerations 
have vied for priority. 1 Water management has been a key factor behind the socio-economic and 
political pressures surrounding dam construction in both developed and developing nations. 
Brazil is a nexus for examining policy implications of dams in both developed and 
developing contexts. With its extensive network of rivers, Brazil has one of the greatest 
hydropower potentials on the planet; it comes as no surprise that hydroelectric power is the 
country’s main electricity production asset, making up more than 75% of the country’s electric 
power.2 The Amazon region has been described as the final frontier for Brazilian hydropower 
development, playing a central role in hydropower efforts and their associated externalities.3 
Belo Monte, located on the Xingu River in the Amazon Rainforest, is the third largest 
hydroelectric dam in the world.4 Brazil is still in a semi-developmental stage and accordingly 
perceives a higher demand for large hydropower projects and infrastructure.5 While hydropower 
can bring immense benefits to Brazil’s energy infrastructure, Belo Monte’s location in the 
Amazon presents serious socio-environmental concerns that are straining Brazil’s legal and 
regulatory regimes. Brazil’s legal structures, enforcement mechanisms, and avenues for public 
participation differ greatly from the United States – these differences and the impact they have 
                                                
1 The Aswan High Dam in Egypt, the Three Gorges dam in China and the Grand Coulee Dam are among 
the largest and most contentious hydropower projects in the world.  
2 Jaichand & Sampaio, Dam and Be Damned at 410 (2013); See also U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, Hydropower supplies more than three quarters of Brazil’s electric power, (2014) 
available at www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=16731  
3 Wilson Cabral de Sousa Júnior and John Reid, Uncertainties in Amazon Hydropower Development: Risk 
Scenarios and Environmental Issues around the Belo Monte Dam, WATER ALTERNATIVES 3(2), 249-268 
(2010) 
4 Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (hereafter AIDA), Belo Monte Fact Sheet (Feb. 
14, 2012) available at http://www.aida-
americas.org/sites/default/files/Belo%20Monte%20Fact%20Sheet%20ENG%2014-02-12.pdf 
5 Id. 
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on addressing hydropower externalities are crucial given the socio-economic benefits at stake in 
the Amazon.   
After a period of explosive growth in dam construction, the United States is now shifting 
into a period of dam removal and decommission.6 This is partly due to increased awareness 
regarding the environmental and social impacts of dams, but made possible by the well-
established cadre of statues, regulatory agencies, and advocacy groups with the power to drive 
meaningful change.7 The accountability and flexibility built into legal and regulatory frameworks 
in the United States have enabled the law to adapt and overcome deficiencies in addressing 
externalities surrounding hydropower development. The procedural requirements of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) act as a check against agency action through public comment 
periods and the option for legal challenges in federal court. These requirements also allow 
agencies to hold each other accountable when proposing major agency actions. When procedural 
process is not enough, substantive statutes such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and 
regulatory frameworks such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) relicensing 
protocols provide regulatory teeth mandating consideration of environmental impacts stemming 
from hydropower projects.8 Stakeholder pressure can push Congress to update antiquated laws 
with fresh amendments, opening previously unavailable avenues for addressing externalities. The 
importance of public participation and effective dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be 
understated; these have and continue to play an integral role in helping the law adapt to meet its 
intended goals. 
Fundamental drivers behind large hydropower projects reflect a nation’s prevailing 
attitude regarding the perceived social, environmental and economic costs and benefits of a 
                                                
6 See generally Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric Power Generation in the United 
States (2012); Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of 
Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81-130 (2001) (hereafter Blumm 
& Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar); Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorson, & Joshua D. 
Smith, Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the 
Endangered Species Act, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Vol. 36, 709, 721 (2006) (hereafter Blumm, et al., 
Practiced at the Art of Deception).   
7 Id. 
8 See generally Blumm & Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism 
in Hydroelectric Licensing (2001); Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA 
Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L. 
J. 87, 144 (2013) (hereafter Blumm & Paulsen, The Role of the Judge in ESA Implementation) 
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project.9 A country’s level of economic development dictates the governance mechanisms and 
policies used in mitigating the socio-environmental costs of hydropower projects.10 While the 
United States and Brazil both have well-established environmental regulatory frameworks in 
place for developing and managing hydropower projects, there are stark differences in how 
stakeholders can participate in the regulatory process. This Comment argues that   public 
participation in the regulatory process and effective dispute resolution mechanisms are critical in 
addressing the socio-environmental externalities stemming from hydropower and ensuring that 
the law is capable of fulfilling its intended goals.  
In Part II, this Comment explores the role of public participation in addressing 
hydropower externalities and introduces core components that make participation mechanisms 
“meaningful.” Part II also discusses the benefits and detriments of hydropower and international 
sustainable development initiatives aimed at addressing hydropower externalities.  
Part III examines the legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding hydropower in the 
United States and Brazil, emphasizing the role of public participation in governance structures 
unique to each country and setting the stage for comparing case studies between the two regimes.  
Part IV analyzes meaningful public participation through case studies in the United States 
and Brazil, comparing how public participation mechanisms interact between the regimes. The 
legal and political firestorm surrounding Belo Monte provides a unique comparison to case 
studies in the United States, where participation evolved from near non-existence to playing a 
major role in the evolution of modern environmental law and its struggles in addressing 
hydropower externalities. 
This Comment concludes with a synopsis of the case studies, with emphasis on public 
participation’s role in dictating a result. Legal regimes, governance structures and challenges 
surrounding hydropower projects are diverse; exploring economic, environmental and social 
issues though case studies in the United States and Brazil will highlight these unique challenges 
and provide context in analyzing public participation’s role in addressing hydropower 
externalities.  
                                                
9 Beck et al., Environmental and Livelihood Impacts of Dams at 13 (2012); Jonathan Rigg, Thailand 
Nam-Choan-Dam Project: a case study in the greening of Southeast Asia, GLOBAL ECOLOGY AND 
BIOGEOGRAPHY LETTERS, 1(2), 42-54 (1991); Sara E. Johnson and Brian E. Graber, Enlisting the social 
sciences in decisions about dam removal, BIOSCIENCE, 52(8), 731-738 (2002) 
10 Id. at 11 (emphasizing that “sufficient policies and governance mechanisms for environmental 
protection are often not implemented until after a country is developed.”  
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BACKGROUND 
 
Hydropower Benefits and Detriments 
 
Ubiquitous with industry and development, more than 45,000 large dams (dams greater 
than 15m in height) have been built worldwide, providing benefits across a variety of scales.11 
As water scarcity and drought become pressing global issues, dams have become valuable water 
storage mechanisms for industrial, municipal and agricultural use.12 Dam projects often provide 
an influx of corporate financial investment and capital in developing nations, benefitting human 
health and infrastructure.13 Perhaps most importantly, dams provide flood control measures 
while simultaneously generating clean hydropower energy for local communities.14  
Hydropower projects can produce a slew of negative environmental impacts. Dam 
construction inherently submerges tracts of land, destroying local wildlife, habitats, and 
ecosystems; loss of ecosystem services such as subsistence farmland and clean water has a direct 
and tangible impact on the livelihoods and cultures of local communities.15 Habitat degradation 
or destruction in the inundated zone is only part of the problem – dams also act as sediment 
barriers, blocking natural riverine flows of water, sediment and critical nutrients that in turn 
impacts fish and other aquatic organisms. 16  Decreased occurrence of natural flooding 
                                                
11 World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. (2000). See also Beck et al., Environmental and Livelihood Impacts of Dams 
at 1-2 (2012). 
12 Dan Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric Power Generation in the United States, 65 
VAND. L. REV. 1723 (2012) (hereafter Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric Power 
Generation in the United States) 
13 1 World Bank, Environmental Licensing for Hydroelectric Projects in Brazil: A Contribution to the 
Debate, Report No. 40995-BR (2008). 
14 Beck et al., Environmental and Livelihood Impacts of Dams at 1-2 (2012); William L. Graf, Dam 
Removal: Science and Decision Making, Washington, D.C.: The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, 
Economics and the Environment (2002) 
15 See generally Sousa Júnior & Reid, Uncertainties in Amazon Hydropower Development at 249 (2010) 
16 Marcia S. Meisler, Mark B. Bain, M. Todd Walter, Predicting barrier passage and habitat suitability 
for migratory fish species, ECOLOGICAL MODELING 220, at 2782 (2009)  
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mechanisms has a stark impact on fertility restoration in riparian areas.17 ish and riverine 
resources are critical facets to the livelihoods of many indigenous peoples, providing both 
financial security and food, and these communities are often the most heavily impacted by 
hydropower developments.18 Dams could even be pegged as point-source polluters; warming 
water and lowering oxygen content can lead to algal blooms, blocking and killing native species 
both up and downstream.19 
 
International Sustainable Development Initiatives 
 
Soft law20 incentives such as those outlined in the hallmark report by the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) have a mutualistic relationship with public participation – 
meaningful implementation of one element will inherently benefit the other, making both 
valuable tools for targeting hydropower externalities.21 After a two year study, the WCD 
recognized that large dams were often riddled with steep social and environmental costs borne by 
displaced peoples, downstream communities, taxpayers, and the environment itself that were 
                                                
17 Bruce P. Shoemaker, Ian G. Baird, Kanokwan Manorum The people and their river: a survey of river-
based livelihoods in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin in central Lao PDR. Vientiane, LAO PDR: CANADA 
FUND FOR LOCAL INITIATIVES (2001). 
18 Beck et al., Environmental and livelihood impacts of dams (2012); See also Shoemaker et al. (2001); 
Patrick McCully, Silenced rivers: the ecology and politics of large dams. London: Zed Books (2001) 
(discussing wide-ranging ecological and human impacts of large dams, including indigenous and 
subsistence-based communities). 
19 James G. Workman, How to Fix Our Dam Problems, Issues in Science and Technology 24, No. 1 
(2007); See also Michael R. Enion, The Case for NPDES Regulation of Dam Discharge, 38 ECOLOGY L. 
Q. 797 (2011) (Discussing National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 530 F.Supp 1291, 1295 (D.D.C. 
1982), a key case supporting the argument that dam discharges should be subject to NPDES permitting. 
In Gorsuch, the D.C. District Court conducted a comprehensive review of water quality impacts from 
dam discharges, holding that they met the CWA’s standard for “discharge of a pollutant” and therefore 
should be subject to NPDES permitting. The D.C. Circuit reversed on Chevron grounds, holding that the 
district court gave improper deference to EPA’s interpretation of the statutory requirements at issue. 
However, the D.C. Circuit did not address the district court’s substantive analysis, and both the Second 
and Seventh Circuits have refused to defer to similar arguments. While this is an evolving area of 
statutory interpretation, most discharges from hydroelectric dams have continued to escape regulation 
under the NPDES program.) 
20 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 54(3), 421, 422 (2000) (Describing “soft law” as a body of law with no 
general enforcement power, “where legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the 
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation”). 
21 World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, 
Earthscan Publications Ltd. at 2 (2000) 
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outweighed by proposed social benefits.22 The study emphasized that “the ‘end’ that any project 
achieves must be the sustainable improvement of human welfare, [meaning] a significant 
advance of human development on a basis that is economically viable, socially equitable and 
environmentally sustainable.”23  Failures during the planning process included issues with 
participation and transparency, alternatives assessments, environmental impact statements (EIS) 
and social impact statements being undertaken late in the process, and monitoring and licensing 
measures being inconsistent or non-existent.24  
The WCD suggested a number of guidelines to help balance equities within large dam 
projects, such as engaging in participatory and multi-criteria analysis of development needs, 
options and impacts, conducting regular monitoring and periodic review, ensuring displaced 
people’s livelihoods are improved and creating enforcement mechanisms and incentives in the 
area of social and environmental performance.25 Unfortunately, these types of soft law incentives 
look good on paper but are difficult to implement on hydropower projects like Belo Monte. 
Powerful political and economic interests can push development forward, skirting laws and 
regulations and ignoring public participation, socio-economic impacts and environmental 
degradation. 26  Developing nations like Brazil often place a higher value on economic 
development at the cost of the environment, a relationship that is exacerbated by inefficient 
accountability and enforcement mechanisms throughout the regulatory process.27 Sustainable 
development initiatives like those proposed by the WCD have catalyzed research efforts and 
increased awareness surrounding the impacts of hydropower, particularly regarding the role of 
public participation.28 However, most of these initiatives have not had the stopping power or 
support to have a tangible impact on hydropower projects and their associated externalities.29 
                                                
22 Id. at xxxi 
23 Id. at 2 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 285 
26 Simone Athayde, Introduction: Indigenous Peoples, Dams and Resistance, Tipití: Journal of the 
Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America, 12(2), Article 1, 80-92, at 82 (2014) 
27 Beck et al., Environmental and livelihood impacts of dams at 12 (2012) 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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Intermediaries, or third-party financial and governance institutions, can play an important 
role in helping curb the social and environmental externalities of hydropower developments.30 
While much of Belo Monte’s funding is national31, intermediaries like the World Bank can often 
use their financial power over developing nations to break through the politics surrounding 
development projects. Uganda’s Bujagali Dam exemplifies this practice in action. Much of the 
project’s funding came from intermediaries, including the World Bank and European Investment 
Bank (EIB).32 The EIB conditioned its $130 million funding on completion of a satisfactory 
environmental and social analysis.33 Intermediaries and non-governmental organizations (NGO) 
worked together in developing external accountability frameworks and targeting social and 
environmental impacts stemming from the Bujagali project, ultimately delaying its construction 
until the government conducted further consultation with impacted parties.34 Intermediaries can 
help introduce accountability and participation mechanisms into the development process by 
holding the borrowing nation accountable for their actions and to higher social or environmental 
standards.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
30 See generally World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-
Making (2000) 
31 See International Rivers, Amazon Watch, AIDA, “BNDES Approves Unprecedented Loan for 
Controversial Amazon Dam” (2012) available at https://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/bndes-
approves-unprecedented-loan-for-controversial-amazon-dam-7749 (Belo Monte’s funding is primarily 
allocated through the Brazilian National Development Bank, which limits financial pressures that 
intermediaries like the World Bank can exert over the project itself.  
32  
33 European Investment Bank, Bujagali Hydroelectric Project, Uganda, (July 2, 2007) available at 
http://www.eib.org/infocentre/press/news/topical_briefs/2007-july-01/bujagali-hydroelectric-project-
uganda.htm 
34 David Ross Olanya, Land and Hydropolitics in the Nile River Basin: Challenges and New Investments, 
EARTHSCAN, at 156-157 (2016) 
35 Id. 
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Public Participation 
 
Foundations and Importance  
 
Public participation is an important element of good governance in environmental 
decision-making.36 Defined as the involvement of stakeholders in administrative functions and 
decision-making,37 promoting public participation fosters transparency and accountability in 
government, whereby a wider base of knowledge and opinions can interact to make informed 
and inclusive decisions.38 Participation helps decision-makers understand the nature of public 
opinion, improving decisions by providing relevant and accurate information and evidence 
related to a proposed action.39 Public participation aids in highlighting the true substance and 
significance underlying the politics of stakeholder concerns about a government action, thereby 
providing a more meaningful instrument for advancing policy on substantive environmental 
issues.40 Participation fosters transparency and accountability in government, simultaneously 
conferring legitimacy upon governmental process and helping counter corruption.41 Timing can 
be critical when examining public participation, as the participation mechanism must be able to 
affect the process and in turn, the outcome, in order to deliver meaningful social benefits.42  
                                                
36 Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: 
Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 266 (1999)  
37 XiaoHu Wang & Montgomery van Wart, When Public Participation in Administration leads to Trust: 
An Empirical Assessment of Managers’ Perceptions, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 67(2), 265-278, 
at 271 (2007) (hereafter Wang & van Wart, When Public Participation in Administration leads to Trust). 
38 Jesse L. Moorman and Zhang Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s 
Environmental Impact Assessment Process: Comparing China’s EIA Law and U.S. NEPA, VERMONT J. 
OF ENVTL. LAW, Vol. 8, 281, 286 (2007); See also Wang & van Wart, When Public Participation in 
Administration leads to Trust at 271 (2007). 
39 Marc B. Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions: Evolving Obstacles 
and Potential Solutions rough Partnership with Experts and Agents, 27 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 151, 165 
(2009) (hereafter, Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions (2009); See 
also Renée A. Irvin & John Stansbury, Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the Effort?, 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW, 64(1) 55-65, at 56 (2004) 
40 Id. 
41 Id.; Moorman and Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s Environmental 
Impact Assessment Process at 287 (2007). 
42 Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions at 164-165 (2009) 
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Critics argue that public participation gets in the way of good science and is an 
ineffective time and resource sink.43 Others have characterized public participation as a tool to 
“channel and contain citizen demands, delay difficult decisions, or build support for agency 
plans”.44 However, oftentimes experts and officials need citizen input to illuminate the facets of a 
given impact or problem that may not be obvious from an external perspective.45 Strong 
partnerships between citizens, experts and advocates provide valuable data and opportunities for 
collaborative analysis on a given project.46 This is particularly true in ideologically charged or 
possibly corrupt regimes where the government, its agencies, or elected officials value 
economically dominant stakeholders over sound science and good governance.47 Brazil fits this 
mold, and many state and local governments in the United States still struggle here as well.48  
Numerous empirical studies have attested to public participation’s impact on government 
decision-making.49 One study highlights a relationship between public participation mechanisms 
and trust in government decision-making, finding that increased participation mechanisms 
improve public trust when producing high-quality services that the public desires and enhancing 
ethical behavior of government administrations.50 This study also concluded that there was a 
strong positive association between participation and government accountability, emphasizing 
public participation’s value as a mechanism promoting accountability.51  
Public meetings have been shown to help citizens provide more constructive feedback in 
the decision-making process, in turn enhancing and the responsiveness and accountability of 
                                                
43 Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle Toward Effective Risk Regulation, Harvard University 
Press, 33-39 (1993); Mark Squillace, Embracing a Civic Republican Tradition in Natural Resources 
Decision-Making, Univ. of Colorado Law School, Legal Research Paper Series at 6-7 (2008) 
44 Caron Chess & Kristen Purcell, Public Participation and the Environment: Do We Know What Works? 
American Chemical Society, Environmental Science and Technology, 33(16), 2685 (1999) (quoting B.J. 
Chekoway, The Politics of Public Hearings, J. OF APPL. BEHAV. SCI., 17(4), 566-81 (1981). 
45 Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions at 160 (2009) 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See Chess & Purcell, Public Participation and the Environment: Do We Know What Works? at 2685, 
2691 (1999); Brian Adams, Public Meetings and the Democratic Process, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
REVIEW, 64(1), 43-54 (2004); Irvin & Stansbury, Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth 
the Effort? at 56 (2004); Wang & van Wart, When Public Participation in Administration leads to Trust 
(2007). 
50 Wang & van Wart, When Public Participation in Administration leads to Trust at 274, 276 (2007). 
51 Id. at 275 
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government.52 Implementing additional deliberation structures within public meetings allows 
citizens to lobby government officials, increasing citizen’s political power and incentivizing 
government responsiveness to their concerns.53 Open forums for citizen participation enhance the 
legitimacy of the political process and the government’s decision-making authority.54  
Chess and Purcell evaluated 12 preceding studies on the effectiveness of public meetings. 
The evaluation concluded that a majority of studies found that public meetings influenced 
government decision-making.55 Further, public participation impacted not only decisions specific 
to the meetings, but also subsequent institutional changes influencing other participation 
mechanisms.56 The study synthesized empirical evidence into a number of “rules of thumb” for 
successful public participation mechanisms, including clarification of goals, advanced planning 
early in the regulatory process, varying forms of participation and collecting feedback on 
participation efforts.57 
Public participation in governance can be a transformative force, whereby individuals 
participating in governmental decision-making experience permanent changes in their outlook 
and lives – meaningful public participation in regulatory regimes can shift societal 
perspectives.58 Entrenched stakeholders often instigate environmental externalities through a 
dominant influence over the legal or regulatory process.59 Meaningful public participation can 
provide mechanisms for impacted groups to break the status quo and advocate for a common 
good (i.e. addressing a hydropower externality) that is not adequately represented amongst 
current organized interests. 60  Open and meaningful participation mechanisms in the 
environmental decision making process help foster an informed citizenry, a transparent and 
                                                
52 Adams, Public Meetings and the Democratic Process, at 52 (2004) 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Chess & Purcell, Public Participation and the Environment: Do We Know What Works? at 2686 (1999) 
56 Id. at 2687 
57 Id.  at 2691. 
58 Naho Mirumachi & Jacopo Torriti, The use of public participation and economic appraisal for public 
involvement in large-scale hydropower projects: Case study of the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project, 
ELSEVIER, Energy Policy 47, 125-132 (2012) 
59 Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions (2009) 
60 Id. 
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accountable government, and overall higher quality decision making related to the 
environment.61 
 
Making Public Participation “Meaningful” 
 
Public participation has inherent value in environmental decision-making, but there is a 
stark contrast between participation that is “meaningful” relative to participation that is merely 
“due” under the law. Oftentimes all that is guaranteed under the law is the opportunity to be 
heard, not a result. 62  Finding ways for regulators and lawmakers to make participation 
mechanisms meaningful is crucial in addressing hydropower externalities. This section will focus 
on three key mechanisms for making public participation more meaningful: (1) Access to and 
quality of information, (2) timing within the regulatory process, and (3) accountability in the 
regulatory and legal process.63 
Increasing access to and quality of information related to a project is one mechanism for 
achieving more meaningful public participation.64 Obtaining information from the government 
subject to a request enables the public to examine the data underlying the government’s decision-
making process.65  Access to information is a necessary element in allowing stakeholders to be 
informed about the nature of the government’s action, which is critical in mounting potential 
legal challenges.66 Understanding and accommodating barriers to information distribution and 
formulating more effective means of access to information promotes more effective and 
meaningful participation.67 As examined later with indigenous peoples impacted by Belo Monte, 
failing to account for cultural and language barriers can reduce a public participation effort to a 
                                                
61 Moorman and Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process at 286 (2007). 
62 Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions That Affect the Environment, 10 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 683, 691 (1993)  
63 This list is non-exhaustive. There are a multitude of important considerations in making public 
participation more meaningful. This paper is focusing on the listed three given their heightened relevance 
and importance in the examined case studies and the hydropower context generally. 
64 Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions That Affect the Environment at 691 (1993)  
65 See generally Christopher M. Johnson, Defining the Content of the Right to Information, Sierra Club 
Legal Defense Fund (1992). 
66 Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions (2009) 
67 Panel on Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making, National Research 
Council (Thomas Dietz & Paul C. Stern eds., 2008) available at http://nap.edu/12434 (hereafter Panel on 
Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making (2008)) 
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mere box on a project’s regulatory checklist. Meaningful public participation needs to be 
inclusive, encompassing the full spectrum of impacted interested and represented parties related 
to the decision.68 Participation mechanisms are ineffective when the underlying information is 
not comprehensive enough for the public to make meaningful determinations and comments 
about the government’s proposed actions.69 Information should be available at a low cost, at 
accessible locations and in electronic form.  
Timing is another critical mechanism for facilitating meaningful public participation. 
Public participation itself must be able to affect the process and outcome, ultimately delivering a 
benefit to the impacted party.70 Impacting the underlying process is critical in changing the 
eventual outcome.71 Participation needs to be conducted at a stage in the regulatory process 
where meaningful interaction on a project’s merits can still occur. Process that fails to impact an 
outcome epitomizes public participation that is merely “due” rather than participation that is 
meaningful and effective. Jumping through regulatory hoops may fulfill a statutory requirement, 
but is ultimately relegating the participation mechanism to a formality as opposed to a 
meaningful opportunity for the public to participate in environmental decision-making. Public 
comments on a proposed hydropower license, for example, are meaningless if the agency in 
question has already granted access rights to a developer in order to start construction. 
Participation that is not meaningful is largely ineffective and fails to meet its core functions.72 It 
does not advance the interests of stakeholders or impacted parties, nor provide useful evidence to 
the decision-makers who are seeking the public interest.73 It does not legitimize the concerns of 
impacted parties nor create significant avenues for fostering civic values and addressing 
environmental externalities.74 Meaningful and effective public participation must be conducted at 
a time where change to the underlying action is still possible and where there are enforceable 
legal rights in play. The timing component emphasizes a core reason underlying public 
                                                
68 See generally Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the New 
Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence (1999) 
69 Id. 
70 Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions at 262 (2009); See also & 
Purcell, Public Participation and the Environment: Do We Know What Works? at 2685, 2691 (1999) 
71 See generally, Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions (2009); Panel 
on Public Participation in Environmental Assessment and Decision Making (2008). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental Decisions at 166 (2009) 
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participation’s importance in environmental decision-making – the reason public participation is 
important to begin with is because it helps regulatory decision makers achieve better results.    
The final mechanism discussed in this paper is accountability. Meaningful public 
participation requires statutory underpinnings that facilitate interaction with regulatory decision 
makers throughout the regulatory process, along with legal enforcement mechanisms when the 
process is inadequate.75 Accountability has significant value in the hydropower context, where 
development projects often have far reaching social, economic and environmental impacts. 
Honing in on environmental impact assessments (EIAs) such as those mandated by NEPA 
provide a specific example of why public participation is important. NEPA puts a limitation on 
the government’s discretion in environmental decision-making. An agency’s requirement to take 
a “hard look” at environmental impacts from a planned action and to consider alternatives 
provides a statutory hook for enforcing government accountability while simultaneously placing 
a check on agency capture by industry or political majority.76 Greater involvement in the EIA 
process helps educate and inform the public while simultaneously providing an outlet to discuss 
controversial elements of a project early on in its development. EIAs are, in a broad sense, an 
attempt to examine and document impacts from a proposed project and its alternatives for the 
purpose of increasing the quality of human life.77 Adjudicatory mechanisms in bodies of 
environmental law facilitate meaningful participation by allowing both the general public and 
experts to interact with regulatory decision makers, the development project, and ultimately the 
project’s impacts and externalities. The importance of public participation and effective dispute 
resolution mechanisms cannot be overstated; these have and continue to play an integral role in 
helping the law adapt to meet its intended goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 Id. 
76 See generally J. William Futrell, Environmental Assessment: The Necessary First Step in Successful 
Environemntal Strategies, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 234, 237 (1991); Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to 
Participate in Decisions That Affect the Environment at 701-702 (1993) 
77 Moorman and Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s Environmental Impact 
Assessment Process at 286 (2007). 
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LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL 
 
The United States 
 
After a period of explosive growth in dam construction, the United States is now shifting 
into a period of dam removal and decommission.78 This is partly due to increased awareness 
regarding the environmental and social impacts of dams, made possible by the well-established 
cadre of statues, regulatory agencies, and advocacy groups with the power to drive meaningful 
change.79  
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) outlines mandatory environmental 
considerations that federal agencies must observe, including the Environmental Impact 
Statement and mandatory public comment periods for examining proposed agency actions. 
NEPA has been an invaluable tool for increasing transparency, accountability and public 
participation in agency actions impacting the environment.80  
While sharing similar EIS requirements with NEPA, the Endangered Species Act is not 
solely procedural and provides more enforcement mechanisms against violators. Although often 
politicized, the ESA has a unique potential to protect endangered and threatened species and 
their ecosystems.  
The Federal Power Act (FPA) and its licensing protocols have become increasingly 
relevant in the age of dam decommission, specifically in protecting riverine ecosystems like the 
Columbia River Basin in the pacific northwest.81 Historic tribal rights and regulatory authority 
                                                
78 See generally Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric Power Generation in the United 
States (2012); Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of 
Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81-130 (2001) (hereafter Blumm 
& Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar); Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorson, & Joshua D. 
Smith, Practiced at the Art of Deception: The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the 
Endangered Species Act, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Vol. 36, 709, 721 (2006) (hereafter Blumm, et al., 
Practiced at the Art of Deception).   
79 Id. 
80 See generally Moorman and Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s 
Environmental Impact Assessment Process at 286 (2007) 
81 See generally Blumm & Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar, 81-130 (2001). 
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have also played an integral role in shaping the way regulatory and legal regimes in the United 
States interact with impacted peoples and address hydropower externalities.82  
Part III (A) will examine how these unique regulatory structures provide accountability, 
enforcement, and licensing measures to address historic issues with dams, albeit with their own 
set of roadblocks and challenges.  
 
The National Environmental Policy Act  
 
Environmental Impact Assessments are a nexus between social, environmental and 
economic values both for the government and the public.83 EIAs were first implemented in the 
United States in 1969 through the National Environmental Policy Act.84 Touted as “the national 
charter for protection of the environment,”85 NEPA seeks to balance environmental concerns in 
policymaking by mandating all federal agencies “create and maintain conditions under which 
man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”86 Unlike substantive statutes such as the Clean 
Water Act, NEPA’s requirements are purely procedural, designed to insure a “fully informed and 
well-considered decision”, but not necessarily a decision the court would have reached.87 “Once 
an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for the 
court is to insure the agency considered the environmental consequences,” not to interject itself 
within the area of discretion reserved for the executive.88 NEPA’s goal is not to prevent an 
agency from taking a proposed action, but rather to force federal agencies to contemplate the 
environmental impacts of their actions before they are implemented.   
                                                
82 See generally Mason Morisset, Tribal Interests, Instream Flows & Hydropower Licensing: Using the 
licensing process to address tribal concerns, The Water Report, No. 92, pp. 1-6 (2011) (hereafter 
Morisset, Tribal Interests, Instream Flows & Hydropower Licensing); Rebecca Cruz Guiao, How Tribal 
Waters Rights are Won in the West: Three Case Studies from the Northwest, Univ. of Oklahoma College 
of Law, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2012-2013), pp. 283-322 (hereafter Guiao, 
How Tribal Waters Rights are Won in the West). 
83 See generally Moorman and Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s 
Environmental Impact Assessment Process at 286 (2007) 
84 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000) [as amended]. 
85 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2017) 
86 42 U.S.C. §4331 
87 Stryker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlan, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980) 
88 Id.  
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NEPA’s keystone requirement is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). An EIS is 
required when a proposed major federal action will significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment.89 Agencies must conduct an Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine the 
nature and impact of the proposed action and whether or not it will require an EIS.90 The EA 
must include the reason for the proposed action, its environmental impacts, and alternatives to 
taking the action.91 If the EA determines that there will be “no significant impact”, then the 
agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) and an EIS is not required.92 If the 
EA determines that an EIS is required through finding of a significant impact, the agency must 
publish a notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register.93  
Pursuant to NEPA, federal actions that will have a significant impact on the environment 
must undergo the EIS, or “detailed statement.”94 The EIS has a variety of specific requirements, 
notable ones being: (1) the purpose and need for the proposed action, (2) alternatives including 
the proposed action, (3) the affected environment, and (4) the environmental consequences of the 
proposed action.95 Public participation is an integral part of NEPA and the EIS procedure; an 
agency preparing the EIS must submit the draft statement for a public comment period.96 Public 
comment periods in particular are crucial in bridging the gap between a mere recitation of 
scientific studies or results and meaningful participation related to on-the-ground concerns of 
stakeholders.97 After the comment period closes, the agency must address any and all substantive 
comments in its final EIS, either by amending the agency action to reflect public comments or 
explaining why the comment does not warrant agency response.98  
One double-edged aspect of the NEPA framework is that agencies retain autonomy in 
promulgating regulations. The public comment period gives citizens, stakeholders and industry 
                                                
89 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
90 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) 
91 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1508.9(a)(1) (2018) 
92 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3 (2018) 
93 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2018) 
94 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2018) 
95 40 C.F.R. § 1502.10 (2018) 
96 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19 (2018) 
97 See Moorman and Ge, Promoting and Strengthening Public Participation in China’s Environmental 
Impact Assessment Process at 295 (2007); Mihaly, Citizen Participation in the Making of Environmental 
Decisions (2009); See generally Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions That Affect the 
Environment, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 683 (1993)  
98 Id. 
 17 
groups a chance to weigh in on the proposed action. While the agency does have to address all 
significant comments, it is not forced to accept them and can still proceed with its proposed 
action if it so chooses. This opens up an avenue for citizens to challenge the agency action in 
federal court, where the judiciary makes a determination about whether or not the rule was just 
and reasonable in light of the factual record. NEPA’s procedural nature often puts meaningful 
participation into question, as stakeholders can lose the ability to directly influence the political 
or environmental impacts of the project in question when procedure itself is the focus rather than 
public concerns about the legal and cultural disputes surrounding environmental issues.99 In 
other words, the government is obligated to engage in public participation, but all the law 
provides is a right to be heard, not a result. 
Maintaining public scrutiny as a core component to NEPA’s implementation ensures that 
the public is receiving high quality information in a timely manner while simultaneously 
providing them with a forum to interact with agency lawmakers and the proposed action itself.100 
The ability to interact with the decision-making process at significant regulatory junctures helps 
create meaningful participation with the potential to dictate a result in the process or outcome.101 
NEPA’s notice requirements enable the public to interact with a proposed federal action 
regardless of whether an EIS is needed, giving citizens groups’ alternative avenues for targeting 
a development project by forcing agencies to take a hard look at the potential for environmental 
impacts in addition to existing statutory requirements.102 Ensuring this level of transparency is 
critical in maintaining effective dispute resolution frameworks, particularly when it comes to 
environmental externalities. Dams often require resettlement of peoples, making their 
participation in decisions highly relevant.  
The administrative system is a careful framework of checks and balances; NEPA and the 
EIS fit well within this structure, allowing agencies to take beneficial actions and citizens to get 
                                                
99 See Kelsey Kahn, NEPA’s fatal flaw, an Impediment to Collaboration, University of Utah College of 
Law, Environmental Dispute Resolution Blog (Sep. 2015), available at https://www.law.utah.edu/nepas-
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the information they need to provide meaningful input and legal challenges. As exemplified 
below,103  the opacity of Brazil’s EIA process has led to a host of accountability issues 
surrounding both EIA requirements and socio-environmental impacts stemming from Belo 
Monte. 
 
The Endangered Species Act 
 
Managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and, in some cases, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the primary goal of the ESA is to protect the 
ecosystem and habitats in which an endangered species lives. Section 4 of the ESA outlines the 
listing process by which a species becomes protected by the ESA. Species meeting one of five 
criteria is eligible for listing.104 The decision to list is based solely on scientific data; economic, 
social and political effects are not considered in the listing process. Once a species is listed, the 
FWS must designate critical habitat.105 Unlike the listing process, the critical habitat designation 
considers the best available science and any other relevant impacts, including economic, social 
and political.106  
Section 7 of the ESA establishes procedures for interagency cooperation and 
consultation. The federal government is prohibited from jeopardizing the continued existence of 
a species and from adversely modifying its designated critical habitat.107 Any agency action that 
will jeopardize a species or its critical habitat must undergo an EIS procedure similar to NEPA, 
requiring further information disclosures and public comment periods and creating additional 
layers of accountability within the regulatory framework.108 The EIS requires considering 
alternatives to the project and examination of how the environment will be affected. If an impact 
                                                
103 See infra Part IV(B)(1): “Licensing and Litigation within IBAMA” 
104 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (To be considered for listing, the species must meet one of five criteria: (1) 
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105 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) 
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is potentially significant, the agency must conduct a Biological Assessment to determine whether 
there will be jeopardy or adverse modification to the species. 
 
Tribal Regulatory Authority, FERC and the Federal Power Act 
 
Tribal regulatory authority and reserved rights stem primarily from the 1908 reserved 
rights doctrine, established by the United States Supreme Court in Winters v. United States.109 In 
effect, the reserved rights doctrine states that, when granting reservation lands to Tribes, the 
federal government impliedly grants access to water reserves adequate to support the purpose of 
the reservation.110 Additional tribal authority originates from the Supreme Court’s 1905 decision 
in United States v. Winans, where the Yakima Tribe’s “right of taking fish at all usual and 
accustomed places” impliedly reserved the right of access to fishing grounds through private 
property.111 Pursuant to Winans, tribally reserved rights are “necessarily and impliedly reserved 
by the tribes in order to give effect to their treaty rights.”112 While related, Winters and Winans 
rights are distinct. Winters rights are primarily reserved waters rights created when the federal 
government creates an Indian reservation.113 Winans rights are broader in scope, encompassing 
rights that are impliedly reserved by tribes through continued exercise of their treaty rights.114  
The Federal Power Act of 1935 governs the construction and operations of all non-
federal hydroelectric projects in the United States.115 Under the FPA, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission has the power to license all non-federal hydropower operations on 
navigable waters of the United States.116 All non-federal dams require a license to operate with a 
term of fifty years or less.117 The FPA offers little guidance on actions surrounding dam 
decommission, reflecting the past belief that operating a dam would always be in the public’s 
                                                
109 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) 
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best interest.118 Recent amendments to the FPA have created new opportunities for addressing 
hydropower externalities. The Electric Consumers Protection Act of 1986 (ECPA) amended the 
FPA and mandated that FERC weigh the benefits of relicensing a project against “the protection, 
mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife (including related spawning 
grounds and habitat).”119 Unlike the ESA, the ECPA provisions apply regardless of whether the 
FERC-licensed project will jeopardize a listed species.  
Tribal regulatory authority surrounding hydropower often interacts with FERC’s 
licensure procedures, the Federal Power Act, and numerous other federal statutes such as the 
Clean Water Act and ESA.120 Pursuant to the Federal Power Act, when issuing a hydropower 
license, FERC is required to include permit conditions “to adequately, and equitably protect, 
mitigate damages to, and enhance fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds and 
habitat)” impacted by the hydropower project.121 These conditions must be based on federal and 
state fish and wildlife agency recommendations submitted pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act,122 and Tribes with natural resources interests can also utilize these statutes.123 
FERC must also require the construction, operation, and maintenance of any federally mandated 
fishways on licensed dams, the basis of which is subject to public comment.124 FERC’s 
obligations surrounding fishways have provided statutory hooks for legal challenges to dam 
licensure and relicensure under both NEPA and the ESA.125 Perhaps most importantly, FERC 
can only issue a hydropower project license on a federal reservation if the agency finds that the 
license will not be inconsistent with or otherwise interfere with the purpose for which the 
reservation was created or acquired.126 FERC’s prominent role in dam licensing presents a 
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number of unique opportunities to utilize the licensing process to mitigate environmental 
externalities stemming from non-federal hydropower projects.127 
The flexibility built into legal and regulatory regimes in the United States has allowed 
them to adapt to address complex environmental problems over time. Public participation has 
evolved into crucial component in the core environmental statues surrounding hydropower 
development. Access to information underlying the government’s decisions, the ability to 
intervene at critical junctures in the regulatory process, and effective accountability mechanisms 
for when process fails have together enabled participation mechanisms in the United States to be 
meaningful in addressing hydropower externalities.   
 
Brazil 
 
On paper, Brazilian regulatory regimes have many similar elements to their U.S. 
counterparts such as frameworks for licensing, EIAs, and public comment periods. In practice, 
however, Brazil’s legal structures, enforcement mechanisms and avenues for public participation 
differ vastly in depth, function and accountability from those in the United States. These 
differences and the impact they have on addressing hydropower externalities are crucial given 
the socio-economic benefits at stake in the Amazon. This section will examine core components 
of the Brazilian legal and regulatory system relating to hydropower development, their 
associated impacts and various elements of public participation within the system.  
Many relevant environmental provisions and protections are included in the Brazilian 
Constitution, including a specific right to an environment that is “an asset of common use and 
essential to a healthy quality of life,”128 along with a right to take legal action to nullify acts 
harmful to the environment.129 Publicly available environmental impact assessments are also 
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codified in Brazilian Constitution.130 The National Environmental Policy establishes a host of 
agencies and regulatory bodies with the power to enforce regulations and promulgate rules 
regarding the environment.  
Brazil’s environmental laws were largely created through the 1981 National 
Environmental Policy (NEP), with the goal of “preserving, improving and recovering the 
environmental quality conducive of a healthy life, with a view to ensuring socio-economic 
development, the interests of national security and the protection of human life.”131 The NEP 
specified twelve instruments for accomplishing its goals, including defining environmental quality 
standards, zoning, licensing, conducting environmental impact assessments, and establishing areas 
for conservation and preservation.132 The NEP also established the National Environment System 
(SISNAMA), a collective body that brings together all environmental agencies in the Union to carry 
out the norms of the Brazilian Federal Constitution.133 The leading administrative body under 
SISNAMA is the National Government Council, which reports to the Brazilian President and is 
responsible for developing guidelines and environmental policies.134 Next came the National 
Environment Council (CONAMA), the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), and lastly, the 
Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA).135   
Many of the environmental and administrative concerns surrounding Belo Monte have 
centered on the actions of IBAMA, specifically IBAMA’s licensing process for hydropower 
projects. 136  The Federal Constitution mandates an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
followed by a corresponding Environmental Impact Report (RIMA) for any projects or activities 
with the potential to cause significant environmental harm.137 The EIA, which is conducted by the 
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company proposing the development and then analyzed by IBAMA,138 includes an environmental 
diagnosis, analysis of environmental impacts, mitigation measures for addressing negative impacts, 
and monitoring protocols for supervising impacts.139 The RIMA reflects the conclusions from the 
EIA and addresses specifics of the development project, including its justification, potential 
alternatives, and probable environmental impacts.140  
Brazil’s EIA requirements differ greatly from those outlined in NEPA. The fact that the 
developer conducts the EIA calls into question the accuracy, impartiality and transparency of data 
underlying proposed projects, which in turn can limit the value of the EIA’s participation 
mechanisms. Further, having the regulated party conduct the requisite EIA puts the government one 
step further away from true accountability, making legal challenges more convoluted. While 
IBAMA’s EIAs are subject to legal challenge and publically available pursuant to the Brazilian 
Constitution,141 ineffective dispute resolution mechanisms in conjunction with anemic regulatory 
accountability mechanisms have trivialized public participation mechanisms surrounding Belo 
Monte’s EIA.142  
IBAMA implements a three-stage process for licensing development projects.143 The first 
stage is a Preliminary License, granted for a maximum of five years during the planning stages;144 
IBAMA analyzes the EIA and RIMA at this stage to evaluate the environmental feasibility of the 
project and whether the application is in accordance with existing environmental legislation.145 
Next, the project must receive an Installation License authorizing development in accordance with 
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specifications in the approved plans, including reduction of negative impacts stated in the EIA.146 
Lastly, the project receives an Operating License authorizing operation of the development project 
after confirmation that previous licensing conditions have been met.147  
Notably, none of these licensure stages offers an opportunity for the public to comment or 
interact with the government’s decision-making process. The mere existence of these regulations 
shows that social and environmental externalities are being considered to some extent, but the lack 
of meaningful mechanisms to participate throughout the development life-cycle and licensing 
process limits impacted parties’ ability to effect real change.148 There are also serious concerns 
about transparency within the regulatory process given that Belo Monte’s Preliminary License was 
granted in the face of more than 40 serious socio-environmental concerns identified during the EIA 
and licensure process.149 The World Bank published a three-volume study on environmental 
licensing projects in Brazil, highlighting a number of changes that could be made to improve the 
process.150 The study recognized that many EIAs submitted as part of IBAMA’s licensing 
procedures were poor quality and evaluated unevenly.151 Increased public participation at these 
early stages of development could, over time, aid in forming a more predictable and transparent 
framework for licensing and EIA protocols.152 More effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
within the EIA and licensing process could also help incentivize more meaningful public 
participation.153 While U.S. statutes like NEPA and the ESA are not panaceas for addressing 
environmental concerns, they provide valuable frameworks for meaningful and comprehensive 
dispute resolution mechanisms that provide more than a mere right to be heard. Robust dispute 
resolution mechanisms can increase avenues for government accountability and meaningful 
public participation within the legal and regulatory system, ultimately mitigating more 
environmental impacts.154 As discussed below, legal challenges can be mounted at various stages 
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of the Brazilian regulatory process, but these opportunities are hardly meaningful or relevant in the 
face of the overwhelming political support driving Belo Monte’s construction. 
The Federal Public Prosecutor’s (MP) office plays a key role in Brazil’s environmental 
regulatory system.  According to a World Bank study on environmental licensing in Brazil, the MP 
“possesses the best educated staff, significant resources and a broad mandate”155 to influence issues 
that do not fall explicitly within their legal jurisdiction, such as defining the national energy matrix 
and establishing economic and environmental priorities.156 Some elements of the MP’s broad, 
autonomous powers extend beyond those of the Brazilian Judiciary.157 The MP has been described 
as a “fourth branch” of Brazilian government tasked with increasing government accountability in a 
sluggish and overwhelmed judicial system.158 The Brazilian Judiciary itself plays an important role 
in the Belo Monte conflict, having both issued and revoked crucial injunctions on the development 
project. Most of the Belo Monte litigation has been filed in the judicial system as Direct Actions of 
Unconstitutionality (ADIN). ADINs receive priority and are sent directly to the Supreme Federal 
Tribunal (STF), the highest level of the Brazilian judiciary.159 The MP is one of a limited pool of 
state and professional institutions allowed to file ADINs, accounting for approximately 15% of total 
ADINs filed.160  
 Indigenous peoples have a variety of protections recognized under Brazilian law. Article 5 
of the Brazilian Constitution, promulgated in 1988, specifies, “[a]ll people are equal before the law, 
without any distinction whatsoever.”161 Article 231, paragraph three recognizes specific indigenous 
rights related to hydropower activities through a mandatory public consultation process between 
Brazil’s National Congress and communities involved or affected by developmental activities.162 
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Established in 1967, the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) is the Brazilian government body 
tasked with developing and implementing policies related to indigenous peoples, including public 
participation mechanisms.163 FUNAI was responsible for conducting a study on the social and 
environmental impacts of the Belo Monte development projects.164 While not formally part of 
Brazil’s legal system, Brazil is also subject to jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR).165 As discussed below, the IACHR has played an important role in 
lending a voice to indigenous peoples’ impacted by Belo Monte as they struggle to exercise their 
rights to participate and be heard under Brazilian law.166  
 Brazil has also ratified the Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries in 2002 (ILO Convention 169).167 Brazil’s ratification of ILO Convention 
169 is notable; it mandates a consultation process with indigenous communities regarding 
activities or legal measures that directly impact their lives or livelihoods.168 While agreement 
does not need to be reached, it must be “undertaken, in good faith and in a form appropriate to 
the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed 
measures.”169 As discussed above, international legal bodies and development initiatives have 
been inconsistent in their ability to meaningfully address hydropower externalities.  
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APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF PROCESS-BASED RIGHTS AND PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION  
 
 Brazil 
 
Despite having well-established regulatory regimes and a judiciary capable of enforcing 
them, Brazilian law has struggled to cope with the vast externalities imposed by the Belo Monte 
dam. As noted, Brazilian law has many similar elements to its U.S. counterparts. Actions 
impacting the environment are required to undergo an EIA, whose results must be made publicly 
available. Agency actions can be challenged in courts, but the judiciary itself has been 
inconsistent in applying and enforcing regulatory requirements on Belo Monte. With domestic 
legal challenges failing to address the serious socio-environmental impacts with Belo Monte, 
impacted peoples have turned to international law. Unfortunately third-party actors have limited 
influence over the Brazilian government, particularly when Belo Monte itself is nationally 
funded. Despite being available under Brazilian law, accountability, public participation and 
dispute resolution mechanisms are failing to force the law to meet its stated purpose. This section 
will examine public participation mechanisms in the context of IBAMA’s EIA and licensure 
process and indigenous peoples’ struggle to be heard under Brazilian and International law.   
 
 Licensing and Litigation within IBAMA  
 
The Belo Monte development officially began moving forward in July of 2005, with the 
Brazilian Congress passing a decree authorizing the project to move into indigenous areas 
contingent upon completion of an anthropological study of the project’s impact.170 Licensing 
programs formally began in 2006, continuing through 2011, but notably stopping in March 2006 
and starting again in February 2007 due to legal challenges in the courts.171 EIAs were first 
presented to IBAMA in July of 2008, although consultation with indigenous groups did not 
                                                
170 Georgia O. Carvalho, Environmental Resistance and the Politics of Energy Development in the 
Brazilian Amazon, J ENV. & DEV.15(3), 245-68 (2006). 
171 Hochstetler, The Politics of Environmental Licensing at 356 (2011) 
 28 
occur until after the EIAs had been completed.172 Three separate injunctions were ordered and 
subsequently overturned between 2008 and 2009, the main concerns being issues with the EIA 
and lack of consultation with local communities.173 IBAMA granted Belo Monte’s Preliminary 
License in February 2010, despite acknowledging more than 40 serious socio-environmental 
concerns identified with the project.174 Two senior IBAMA officials resigned in 2009 and two 
IBAMA Presidents resigned in 2010 and 2011, respectively.175 Each of these individuals cited 
high-level political pressure as the reason for their resignation.176 The Brazilian Federal Court 
again halted work on the dam in August 2012 on the grounds that indigenous peoples had not 
been consulted – the Supreme Federal Court overturned the decision a mere two weeks later.177 
 Despite having a seemingly well-established environmental regulatory regime and 
judicial system, there is little accountability throughout the process. Transparency and 
accountability are critical in supporting effective dispute resolution frameworks and giving the 
public avenues for challenging and evaluating government actions.178 Project injunctions have 
been ordered and dismissed in two-week time frames, a feat unheard of in the U.S. court system. 
While the EIA was completed, there was incomplete information regarding potential impacts and 
mitigation measures, both of which are a required aspect of the EIA. 179  International 
organizations such as the World Bank have described Brazilian EIAs as poor in quality, with 
uneven evaluation by the government.180 Belo Monte’s license was approved by IBAMA despite 
a cadre of serious environmental and human rights concerns, and existing dispute resolution 
mechanisms are unable to effect meaningful change. While there are some avenues for 
challenging administrative decisions and public participation in the EIA process, it is not 
recognized or enforced to the same extent as, for example, NEPA provisions in the United States. 
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As discussed below, NEPA and the ESA enjoined the operation and final development of a 
major hydropower project over a species of perch;181 Belo Monte has emerged from a firestorm 
of legal challenges and public disputes unscathed.  
Perhaps most importantly, the EIA only looks at the impacts of Belo Monte and its 
immediate inundated zone.182 Belo Monte is a gateway dam – its construction will pave the way 
for as many as six other dam projects in the surrounding area, including the controversial 
Altamira Dam.183 Many experts believe that Belo Monte cannot function at peak capacity and 
provide the benefits alleged in the EIS and planning documents without the construction of 
subsequent dams.184 This fact is illuminating when comparing Belo Monte to large hydropower 
projects in the United States, particularly in the context of EIAs and public participation. After a 
series of cases surrounding NEPA requirements, the Ninth Circuit held in Thomas v. Peterson 
that a federal agency must prepare a single EIS for “connected” and “cumulative” actions to 
determine whether the proposed action will significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment.185 In functioning as a gateway dam, Belo Monte is “connected” as the cornerstone 
dam in the government’s aggregate hydropower plan for the Amazon. Belo Monte’s impacts are 
also “cumulative,” in that they will compound significant socio-environmental impacts stemming 
from all of the proposed dams. Under U.S. law, citizens would at the very least be able to bring 
suit against IBAMA’s EIA protocol, as it does not adequately meet the cumulative impacts 
doctrine.  
The Brazilian legal and regulatory regime has some semblance of data available that the 
public can use to examine the government’s proposed action, but there is a sharp disparity in the 
accountability measures citizens can use to challenge government action. Despite glaring faults 
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with the government’s EIA, citizens are unable to meaningfully impact the underlying action.186 
Comparing accountability and dispute resolution mechanisms within the EIA process 
demonstrates the importance of meaningful public participation in addressing hydropower 
externalities as opposed to a mere right to be heard under the law.  
It should also be noted that United States is not beholden to hydropower as an energy 
source, whereas 75% of Brazil’s electricity comes from hydropower.187 There is immense 
controversy over the true energy benefits that Belo Monte will bring to Brazil and the Amazon 
region; specifically regarding proposed mitigation measures and the dam’s true hydroelectric 
potential.188 More transparency and access to information within the EIA process would enable 
stakeholders to examine the underlying data the government is relying on in its analysis of Belo 
Monte. Access to high quality data is crucial in allowing the public to make informed comments 
on the development and in holding the government accountable under the law.189 More effective 
dispute resolution mechanisms within Brazil’s regulatory process would allow citizens to 
challenge Belo Monte’s feasibility relative both to its socio-environmental impacts and to 
proposed alternatives, similar to challenging an agency action under NEPA.190 The EIA’s failure 
to consider the immense impact that subsequent dam projects will have both on the environment 
and on indigenous peoples is tantamount to the government ignoring any and all potential future 
impacts in favor of securing project approval.191 This tunnel-vision approach to dam construction 
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echoes early hydropower developments in the United States, where serious concerns for Native 
Americans were simply ignored in favor of development.  
 
 Indigenous Peoples and the IACHR 
 
Indigenous peoples and local communities have not been granted the full scope of their 
legal rights nor an adequate opportunity for meaningful participation in the regulatory and legal 
proceedings surrounding Belo Monte’s construction.192 As noted above, provisions in ILO 
Convention 169 and the Brazilian Constitution recognize an independent right to open and 
meaningful consultation with indigenous peoples on decisions affecting their wellbeing.193 Four 
public hearings were organized for local communities, however no translators were provided for 
those indigenous peoples who managed to attend and the vast majority of the approximately 
40,000 peoples adversely impacted by Belo Monte were unable to have their questions 
answered.194 FUNAI also conducted meetings to allegedly consult with indigenous peoples. 
Neither these meetings nor the public hearings were conducted in a free, prior and informed 
manner.195 Regardless, Article 231 Paragraph 3 of the Brazilian Constitution stipulates that the 
National Congress, not FUNAI, must conduct the indigenous people’s consultation process. As 
such, the meetings themselves were not fulfilling the government’s constitutional obligations to 
consult with affected indigenous peoples.  
Left with effectively no recourse within the Brazilian legal system and administrative 
agencies, local communities and NGOs pleaded their case to the IACHR.196 The IACHR granted 
precautionary measures to the indigenous communities in the Xingu River Basin, requesting that 
the Brazilian government “immediately suspend the licensing process for the Belo Monte 
Hydroelectric Plant project and stop any construction work from moving forward until certain 
minimum conditions are met.” 197  The IACHR Response mandated a fulfillment of free, 
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informed, and good faith consultations and a guarantee that the indigenous communities receive 
translated copies of the Social and Environmental Impact Statements beforehand, information the 
government had neglected to provide in the initial consultations.198 Lastly, the IACHR ordered 
the government to “adopt measures to protect the life and physical integrity of the members of 
the indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation of the Xingu Basin.”199  
Rather than acknowledge and comply with the IACHR recommendations, the Brazilian 
government opted to suspend its annual contribution to the Commission and conduct a Senate 
vote for a censure against the recommendations.200 The government also threatened to cut 
funding to the IACHR and to withdraw from the organization.201 Two months later, IBAMA 
issued Belo Monte’s final construction permit, incorporating new socio-environmental reasons 
for approval and stating that no indigenous peoples would be directly affected.202 This cuts 
directly against the previous meetings organized by FUNAI – if indigenous peoples were not 
going to be affected then there would be no reason to engage in a consultation process to begin 
with.203 The Brazilian government has disregarded the IACHR’s determination that Belo Monte 
would have a major impact on the land and livelihood of indigenous peoples along with 
constitutional protections put in place for indigenous peoples. Construction on Belo Monte began 
in June 2011, despite a legal challenge filed by the MP in Brazil’s eleventh court and the 
staggering array of socio-environmental issues identified during the EIA process.204   
The Belo Monte saga highlights that merely having a right to public participation is not 
enough in itself to combat hydropower externalities. Public participation is not meaningful when 
access to the legal and regulatory system is provided at a stage where no true impact can be made 
on the development, or when participation mechanisms fail to provide basic translation services 
allowing indigenous peoples to interact with the process and information the government is 
relying upon.205 Government agencies need to engage in the public participation process with 
proper planning and timing, adequate resources and an overall commitment to using the public 
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process to inform their actions.206 Anything less risks public participation mechanisms not being 
meaningful, or otherwise falling short of their intended goals.207 Looking at these difficulties and 
failures highlights a unique facet in the early development of environmental and social issues 
stemming from large dams: Once a project gets through its preliminarily technical and 
economical feasibility procedures, interest from government, industry or other powerful interest 
groups can generate immense momentum, thereby steamrolling over further assessments.208 This 
has been particularly evident with the events surrounding Belo Monte. As discussed in the next 
section, even the extensive public participation and accountability frameworks seen in the United 
States can fall short in addressing externalities when the development is supported by strong 
political interest from governments or industry groups.  
 
The United States 
 
 The accountability and flexibility built into legal and regulatory frameworks in the United 
States have enabled the law to adapt and overcome deficiencies in addressing externalities 
surrounding hydropower development. The procedural requirements of NEPA act as a check 
against agency action through public comment periods and the option for legal challenges in 
federal court. These requirements also allow agencies to hold each other accountable when 
proposing major agency actions. When procedural process is not enough, substantive statutes 
such as the ESA and regulatory frameworks such as FERC’s relicensing protocols provide 
regulatory teeth mandating consideration of environmental impacts stemming from hydropower 
projects.209 Stakeholder pressure can push Congress to update antiquated laws with fresh 
amendments, opening previously unavailable avenues for addressing externalities. The 
importance of public participation and effective dispute resolution mechanisms cannot be 
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understated; these have and continue to play an integral role in helping the law adapt to meet its 
intended goals. This section will analyze public participation’s role in addressing hydropower 
externalities across a variety of case studies. Beginning with a historical period lacking 
meaningful public participation for Native Americans, transitioning into historic evolutions in 
the United States’ environmental legal and regulatory regimes, and culminating in the creation of 
created new mechanisms for public participation, litigation, and environmental management 
surrounding hydropower projects. 
 
Native Americans and the historic struggle to address hydropower externalities in the 
United States 
 
Throughout the 1800s, Native American tribes ceded millions of acres of land to the U.S. 
government through treaties.210 These land cessations and treaties laid the groundwork for 
decades of conflict over reserved rights, particularly those related to water usage for hunting and 
fishing.211  Land cessation also paved the way for many of the large hydropower projects that are 
the focus of this paper.  
In an 1864 treaty, the Klamath Tribes ceded 90% of their lands, more than 23 million acres, to 
the United States, retaining hunting, fishing and gathering rights.212 This land cessation was the 
foundation for the Klamath Project. Authorized in 1905, shortly after Congress passed the 
Reclamation Act,213 the Klamath Project was a large-scale water reclamation initiative designed 
to allocate irrigation water throughout the historically arid region.214 The Klamath Project 
drained numerous lakes designated as National Wildlife Refuges and is closely intertwined with 
seven large dam development projects constructed between 1902 and 1967.215 In 1954, Congress 
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terminated the Klamath Tribes’ federal recognition via the Termination Act, leading to the sale 
of valuable forestland on the reservation, but specifically not abrogating any water rights of these 
tribes.216 Federal recognition was restored in 1986, but no lands were returned to the tribes.217  
 The Warm Springs and Wasco tribes ceded over 10 million acres of traditional 
reservation land in Oregon to the United States government through an 1855 treaty. Again, these 
tribes reserved “the exclusive right of taking fish in the streams running through and bordering 
said reservation . . . and at all other usual and accustomed stations.”218 The 1941 Grand Coulee 
Dam devastated salmon runs in the Upper Columbia River, creating a barrier to nearly fifty 
percent of historic salmon spawning grounds.219 Lower Columbia River runs were similarly 
impacted, with listed species sustaining losses of thirty-five to forty percent of historic habitat 
due to hydropower impasse.220 
Prior to the evolution of modern environmental law in the 1970s, Native American tribes 
had little to no participation in the legal and regulatory process surrounding hydropower outside 
the reserved rights established in treaties and the Winters and Winans decisions.221 This lack of 
participation was a component in many hydropower projects impacting tribal lands, where tribes 
with little representation were forced to bear the social, environmental and economic costs of 
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development with little to no benefit. 222  Hydropower projects in the United States have 
historically been conducted with disregard for the vast environmental externalities inherent with 
dams. Lack of meaningful public participation mechanisms such as access to information and 
regulatory enforcement mechanisms like those found in NEPA made it onerous for tribal groups 
to fight hydropower developments impacting riverine resources and leaving many tribes unable 
to exercise their reserved rights.  
Tribal groups in the United States have experienced many of the same social, economic 
and environmental externalities that indigenous peoples currently face with Belo Monte in 
Brazil. Lack of meaningful public participation mechanisms is only one facet of the problem – 
generally speaking, the law was unequipped or governing bodies were simply unwilling to 
address the complex and far-reaching externalities inherent with hydropower development. As 
examined in the next section, it took decades for United States law to begin addressing 
hydropower’s many externalities. However, evolving bodies of law is only part of the solution. A 
commonality between early hydropower in the United States and Belo Monte in Brazil is the 
government’s focus on development at the cost of externalities imposed on impacted peoples. 
Economic and political interests in large hydropower projects continue to limit the power, impact 
and effectiveness of modern environmental procedures.223  
 
Modern environmental law brings new mechanisms to the fight 
 
 Modern environmental statutes such as NEPA and the ESA heralded in a new age for 
public participation in the hydropower regulatory process.224 While these initial environmental 
laws did not directly target dams and hydropower, the environmental and regulatory constraints 
these statutes imposed made new hydropower developments an onerous process.225 This section 
examines how policy changes in the late 20th century gradually shifted the emphasis of public 
debate to the negative impact of dams, whereby public participation mechanisms began playing a 
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larger role in combatting hydropower externalities through the growth of some of the world’s 
most powerful and comprehensive environmental laws.226  
 
Collaborative Approaches to Addressing Hydropower Externalities 
 
Bringing public participation mechanisms to the forefront of hydropower developments 
was an invaluable step towards meaningful negotiations and collaborative approaches to 
addressing the environmental externalities of dams, particularly for Native American tribes 
impacted by hydropower projects. In 1982, the Reagan administration, in response to frustration 
with the “glacial” progress in Indian water rights cases, announced a new policy focused on 
negotiating tribal water rights.227 The administration encouraged tribes to resolve existing water 
disputes through negotiation, and the Warm Springs tribe was an ideal candidate.228 Fifteen 
formal negotiations took place between three parties, most of which centered on quantifying the 
Warm Springs tribe’s reserved water rights.229 The Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs 
Reservation Water Rights Settlement Agreement was signed in November 1997, establishing the 
scope and priority of the Warm Springs tribe’s reserved water rights.230  
Solidifying the tribe’s reserved water right through a final decree gave the tribe firm legal 
footing for protecting their water rights against environmental externalities. The Reagan 
administration’s shift towards negotiating with the Warm Springs tribe is symptomatic of the 
larger shifts in United States regarding environmental law and the externalities the law sought to 
combat.231 Nevertheless, these good faith negotiations initiated by the government allowed the 
Warm Springs tribe to meaningfully participate in the regulatory system at a point in time when 
the eventual outcome could still be altered, and in a manner that held the government 
accountable for both the actions it was taking and the tribal rights it was acknowledging. The 
ability to impact the underlying regulatory process and to hold governments accountable for their 
                                                
226 Beck et al., Environmental and Livelihood Impacts of Dams at 4 (2012) 
227 Daniel McCool, Native Waters: Contemporary Indian Water Settlements and the Second Treaty Era, 
46 (2002) 
228 Id. at 47 
229 Guiao, How Tribal Waters Rights are Won in the West at 295-296 (2013) 
230 Id. 
231 Beck et al., Environmental and Livelihood Impacts of Dams at 4 (2012) 
 38 
actions (or lack thereof) has continued to be a core element of meaningful participation in the 
hydropower context.232  
Meanwhile, demands for water in the Upper Klamath Basin had been increasing for 
nearly a hundred years since the Klamath Project’s authorization in 1905.233 Competing demands 
from irrigators, the Klamath River tribes, hydropower projects and the Endangered Species Act 
came to a head during a drought in the summer of 2001 one of the driest years on record.234 The 
Bureau of Reclamation closed the Klamath Project’s headgates and halted irrigation deliveries to 
protect endangered fish that were jeopardized by the Klamath Project.235 This marked the first 
time that the ESA had restricted a large-scale water delivery for a federal project.236 The Klamath 
Basin controversy employed numerous methods in attempting to find a solution, including 
litigation and the political process, but a collaborative process and negotiation between 
stakeholders ultimately dictated the most effective result. 237  Using FERC’s relicensing 
framework and the Klamath Hydroelectric Project’s March 2006 relicensing deadline as an 
anchor, a group of Klamath Basin stakeholders238 came together and developed two companion 
agreements as an alternative to FERC’s relicensing of the dams.239  
The Klamath Basin Restoration Agreement (KHBA) and the Klamath Hydroelectric 
Settlement Agreement (KHSA) provide a comprehensive plan to remove four large dams, 
balance water use in the Basin and provide more economic stability for all of the Klamath’s rural 
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economies.240 The agreements were signed by forty-five organizations of federal agencies, tribes, 
counties, irrigators, conservationists, and fishing groups.241 Meaningful public participation 
mechanisms within the ESA, FPA and FERC’s regulatory procedures enabled Klamath Basin 
stakeholders to find to a collaborative solution to hydropower externalities in the Basin. Access 
to high quality information regarding the Klamath Hydroelectric Project and the ability to 
challenge FERC’s relicensure of the dams before an agency decision highlight the importance of 
meaningful participation and effective dispute resolution mechanisms in addressing hydropower 
externalities. 
Successful negotiations in the Klamath Basin and Columbia River provide a stark 
contrast with the negotiations and public participation mechanisms observed with indigenous 
peoples in Brazil. The Brazilian government’s entrenched support of the Belo Monte dam has 
trivialized the public participation process. One key element underlying the successful 
negotiations in the United States cases studies was the government’s commitment to using the 
public process to inform its actions, specifically with a focus on finding a collaborative and 
synergistic outcome.242 Public participation is not meaningful when the government is merely 
jumping through regulatory hoops. The organizational commitment to addressing hydropower 
externalities in these case studies was a critical factor in why the public participation 
mechanisms were both meaningful and successful in dictating a result.243  
 
Public Participation via Litigation 
 
 Litigation has been a powerful instrument for addressing hydropower externalities and in 
expanding the reach and power of modern environmental law. Public participation through 
litigation has been a hallmark dimension of modern environmental law, with most of the major 
environmental statues allowing citizen suits to challenge agency action.244 This section will 
discuss hydropower litigation from a variety of angles to illustrate how United States law has 
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evolved to more effectively address hydropower externalities, while also highlighting areas 
where the law has struggled to meet its intended goals.     
 
The Tellico Dam  
 
The Endangered Species Act has been a recurrent tool in battling the negative 
externalities surrounding hydropower, though with varying results. Often politicized as a 
draconian statute, the ESA has been versatile in addressing hydropower externalities. 245 
Litigation surrounding Tennessee’s Tellico Dam is an infamous example of the ESA’s ability to 
impede dam construction. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, a dam project was successfully 
enjoined due to the discovery and subsequent ESA listing of the snail darter, a previously 
unknown species of perch.246 Construction on the dam began before the ESA was enacted. By 
the time the darter was listed under the ESA, hundreds of millions of dollars had been spent on 
the project and it was near completion. Nonetheless, the Secretary of the Interior determined that 
the darter’s “critical habitat” was in a portion of the lower Tennessee River, which would be 
completely inundated by the dam.247 Pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA, the Secretary ordered all 
federal agencies to take action as necessary “to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried 
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence” of the species,248 effectively enjoining 
the dam for the time being. 
 The ESA’s ability to forestall a project that was virtually completed is not to be 
understated. The language of the ESA, and in turn, the intent of Congress, places an incalculable 
value on endangered and threatened species. While Tellico illustrates the ESA dictating a 
positive result, the case simultaneously demonstrates how public participation in the regulatory 
process can only take you so far when powerful interests are adamant on a development project. 
The Tellico Dam was eventually completed in 1980 through an unrelated congressional 
appropriations rider, virtually nullifying the entire legal saga. While the ESA’s teeth make it a 
valuable tool for combating externalities associated with hydropower projects, Tellico’s end 
result exemplifies that even one of the nation’s most comprehensive and far-reaching regulatory 
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schemes is unable to fully combat hydropower externalities. Tellico has striking parallels to the 
controversy surrounding Belo Monte – a congressional appropriations rider pushed through the 
Tellico Dam over litigation and public outcry, demonstrating that rights given by the legislature 
can be taken away, subject to takings limitations. Public participation is a versatile and valuable 
mechanism for combatting hydropower externalities, but it is not without limits. 
 
 The Columbia River Salmon Saga 
 
Home to one of the world’s largest hydroelectric systems, the Columbia River and its 
salmon runs have been one of the most prominent restoration efforts in United States history and 
a lightning rod for ESA litigation.249 Despite a 1980 Congressional declaration that salmon and 
hydropower were “co-equals” in the Columbia Basin system, most of the Columbia’s salmon 
species have been listed under the ESA.250 Charged with implementing the ESA in the Columbia 
Basin, NOAA has consistently used its administrative discretion to preserve hydropower 
interests in the region, spurring two decades of legal challenges to NOAA’s ESA 
implementation.251 A number of watershed moments have occurred throughout this saga. In 
2005, Judge Redden, presiding over the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, authored a 
scathing remand of NOAA’s 2004 Biological Opinion (BiOp) in which the court threatened to 
step in and “run the river” from the bench should NOAA fail to follow the terms of his order.252 
Judge Redden urged cooperation between the parties through regular reporting of meetings and 
progress to the court.253 These reports were an innovative mechanism for interjecting more 
meaningful public participation into the legal proceedings, reflecting the court’s view that public 
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participation in agency decision-making is critical to striking an equitable balance of interests.254 
The ESA does not provide a right to public comment on Section 7 consultation procedures; 
Judge Redden’s mandate for quarterly reports from NOAA was a subtle means of creating a 
limited form of public participation where there would otherwise be none.255 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld Judge Redden’s landmark remand in April 2007, emphasizing 
agreement that the 2004 BiOp “contained structural flaws that rendered it incompatible with the 
ESA.”256  
Litigation had been ongoing for six more years when the National Wildlife Federation 
(NWF) – in its seventh amended complaints since 2001 – challenged not only the current 2014 
BiOp, but also argued that the government needed to prepare an EIS for each of the 73 actions 
underlying the BiOp.257 In May 2016, the U.S. District Court of Oregon issued an opinion siding 
with NWF on almost every argument.258 The court emphasized the importance of public 
participation in the context of NEPA’s EIS, stating “Congress enacted [NEPA] to ensure a 
process in which all reasonable alternatives are given a ‘hard look’ and all necessary information 
is provided to the public.”259 The battle to protect salmon in the Columbia River Basin is 
ongoing, and meaningful public participation continues to play an integral role. Transparent and 
open access to information underlying the government’s decision has been crucial in challenging 
the government’s implementation of the NEPA and the ESA. These legal challenges are complex 
and not always successful, but the ability for stakeholders to interact with government action and 
have a meaningful impact on the underlying process and result is crucial.260 The Columbia River 
saga’s long history of litigation and recalcitrant agency action echoes the symptoms plaguing 
Belo Monte, where a comparative lack of legal and regulatory accountability has left 
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comprehensive legal challenges to the government’s licensing and development stranded or 
buried. The importance of public participation and effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
cannot be overstated; these have and continue to play an integral role in helping the law meet its 
intended goals.  
 
FERC, the FPA, and Tribal Rights Litigation 
  
The Federal Power Act has developed into an effective mechanism for addressing 
environmental issues with dams through restricting stream flows and novel interpretations of 
FERC’s licensing powers. 261  The FPA has a significant impact on many activities and 
hydropower externalities, such as recreation, water quality, and fish and wildlife habitat. The 
relicensing protocols, specifically the 1986 Electric Consumers Protection Act amendments, 
demand a reexamination of the project based on present day values.262 The ECPA amendments 
attempted to safeguard fish and wildlife interests in the relicensing process by imposing 
substantive and procedural requirements on FERC such as notice provisions, public comment 
periods, and inter-agency consultation. 263  Unlike the ESA, the ECPA requirements apply 
regardless of whether a project will jeopardize a listed species or not.264 This offers more 
consistent and reaching protection than the ESA; not all FERC-licensed projects are jeopardizing 
a listed species, but the ECPA mandates that FERC consider impacts on wildlife and the 
environment during its relicensing process.265 It is important to note that the ECPA does not 
prevent relicensing. Rather, the ECPA simultaneously acknowledges hydropower’s benefits and 
its environmental externalities, mandating that FERC weigh them accordingly in its decision-
making process.266 Much like NEPA, FERC is not prevented from relicensing a dam so long as it 
jumps through the regulatory hoops, and its determinations are subject to challenge in federal 
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court. This mitigation and rehabilitation strategy seems even more promising given that several 
hundred dams will require relicensing from FERC in the coming decades.267  
As discussed above, many tribal reserved rights are closely tied to environments and 
activities falling within FERC’s jurisdiction. Accountability and enforcement mechanisms built 
into many of today’s environmental laws have allowed Native American tribes to constrain 
hydropower development and operation through litigation.268 FERC’s seemingly autonomous 
power was dealt a blow in Escondido Mutual Water Company v. La Jolla Band of Mission 
Indians, holding that the Secretary of the Interior could impose license conditions on FERC for 
projects benefitting Indian reservations under the Department of Interior’s (DOI) supervision.269 
In PUD No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, the Supreme Court held 
that section 401 of the Clean Water Act gives states the power to impose minimum flows for fish 
protection and aesthetic enhancement in accordance with state water quality standards.270 PUD 
No. 1’s requirement that FERC accept section 401 conditions imposed by states has created a 
legal hook for environmental groups seeking to impose minimum flow or environmental release 
conditions on FERC licenses, further demonstrating the power of meaningful public participation 
in a transparent and accountable regulatory regime.271 
More recently, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held in City of Tacoma v. Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n that FERC’s licensure of any project located partially on an Indian 
reservation must “not interfere or be inconsistent with the purpose for which the reservation was 
created or acquired.”272 City of Tacoma also established that the FPA gives FERC the authority 
to deny relicensing of a project and order that the dam be decommissioned if it has become 
uneconomic. 273  Typically Congress must make major dam removal decisions, but this 
construction of the FPA makes it clear that FERC has the power to decommission certain 
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licensed dams.274 Increasing FERC’s flexibility regarding relicensing has given stakeholders new 
legal footholds for challenging hydropower externalities through relicensing, a critical time 
juncture with a unique ability to impact agency actions. NEPA’s required EIS for major federal 
actions combined with FERC’s mandated feasibility studies has provided a wealth of valuable 
information the public can analyze in examining (and potentially challenging) the basis for the 
government’s proposed action. 
Many studies and scholars in the hydropower arena have argued that small-scale 
hydropower projects are the future of the resource, in contrast with the typical federally funded 
FERC-licensed projects that have been so controversial in the last few decades.275 Public policy 
debates on the social, environmental and economic benefits of hydropower projects will continue 
to shape the resource’s future.276 Examining the litigation surrounding FERC, the ESA and the 
FPA exemplifies how the structure of U.S. regulatory regimes can both help and harm efforts to 
address dam externalities. The ECPA amendments created a unique avenue for effecting 
meaningful change through relicensing, but the structure of the licensing regulations allowed 
FERC to unilaterally ignore this opportunity until litigation forced the agency’s hand.  FERC and 
the FPA highlight the importance of being able to challenge agency action at key points in the 
regulatory process, allowing stakeholders to pressure agencies and bend regulatory regimes 
towards beneficial uses in changing times. 
 
Dam Removal and Decommission 
 
 As discussed above, the 1920 Federal Power Act streamlined the hydropower 
development processes and laid the groundwork for FERC’s historic support of large 
hydropower developments in the United States.277 Responding to significant shifts in public 
perception and changes in hydropower’s economic benefits, Congress adapted the FPA’s 
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regulatory structure to prevent and even rectify environmental degradation.278 This section will 
examine the Edwards Dam Project, where litigation, negotiation, public participation, and 
innovative interpretations of regulatory frameworks came together to address hydropower 
externalities through dam decommission. 
The Edwards Dam was constructed on Maine’s Kennebec River in 1837.279 State, federal 
and private interests sought removal of the dam to combat longstanding negative impacts on 
fishery resources, along with environmental degradation and impaired recreational activities.280 
In a landmark decision, FERC denied the dam’s relicensing request, ruling that the public 
interest required removal of the Edwards Dam.281 This was the first time the federal government 
had mandated decommission over a dam owner’s objection.282 FERC relied on the EIS prepared 
under NEPA in concluding that the public interest would be best serviced by dam removal, 
determining that removal was the only option for mitigating the dam’s adverse environmental 
impacts. 283  FERC also conducted extensive economic evaluations of the Project and its 
alternatives, finding that decommission made the most financial sense given the extensive costs 
associated with relicensing.284 
While complex in nature, dam decommissioning procedures requiring involvement of 
citizens and federal, state, and local governments inherently promote core tenants of meaningful 
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participation.285 In the Edwards Project, the EIS conducted pursuant to NEPA286 and FERC’s 
own requirement to issue licenses only for plans “best adapted to serve the public interest”287 
provided an abundance of accessible information that stakeholders could utilize in evaluating the 
government’s decision on the project. Stakeholders’ ability to participate in FERC’s evaluation 
of the Edwards dam’s relicensing application satisfies the timing component for making public 
participation meaningful. The relicensing stage is an excellent example of participating in the 
regulatory process at a stage with critical bearing on the proposed action’s eventual outcome.288 
FERC’s decision with the Edwards dam was successful in addressing hydropower externalities, 
but accountability measures and dispute resolution mechanisms built into NEPA, the ESA and 
the FPA were available should FERC have come to a conclusion at odds with the underlying data 
or statutory requirements.  
Fundamental drivers behind large dam projects reflect a nation’s prevailing attitude 
regarding the perceived social, environmental and economic costs and benefits of a project, 
regardless of whether there is actual empirical evidence for or against a project.289 Beck, et al. 
posit that there is an inverse relationship between environmental capital and policy effectiveness, 
“such that as economic development increases, environmental capital is diminished whereas 
policy effectiveness becomes maximized.”290 This analysis highlights a temporal component of 
economic development dictating the governance mechanisms and policies used in mitigating the 
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socio-environmental costs of hydropower projects.291 Working under this framework, it follows 
that lack of environmental capital and benefits from resource acquisition in U.S. hydropower 
projects has contributed to the nation’s shift toward dam removal and decommission.292 Brazil is 
less economically developed than the U.S. and accordingly derives a higher relative benefit from 
environmental capital, hence the overwhelming political support for Belo Monte.  
Proponents of dam projects often have a substantially disproportionate impact on the 
decision-making process relative to critics, particularly in developing nations where legal and 
regulatory regimes are not as developed and where there is a higher perceived benefit for 
environmental capital.293 The shift away from dam construction in the United States exemplifies 
that common benefits in support of hydropower projects (electricity generation, flood control, 
etc.) are no longer sufficient to justify the continued existence and associated impacts of such 
projects.294 As depicted with the Edwards Dam removal, meaningful public participation is 
crucial in addressing hydropower externalities at junctures where hydropower projects are being 
considered for construction, relicensing, or removal. Public participation mechanisms in the 
United States have historically struggled to impede dam construction, but the evolution of 
environmental law and installation of more meaningful participation mechanisms has been 
integral to addressing hydropower externalities through dam decommission and 
deconstruction.295 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Public participation in the regulatory process and effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
are critical in addressing the socio-environmental externalities stemming from hydropower and 
ensuring that the law is capable of fulfilling its intended goals. This Comment discussed three 
key mechanisms for making public participation more meaningful through case studies and 
comparisons between the United States and Brazil.  
Access to the information underlying the government’s decision-making process for a 
proposed action is crucial for establishing meaningful participation. Indigenous peoples impacted 
by Belo Monte have not had meaningful access to information as demonstrated by the 
government’s failure to translate and distribute Belo Monte’s EIA, along with its opacity in 
addressing socio-environmental concerns brought up during the EIA and licensure process. 
These shortcomings echo those faced by Native Americans with early hydropower developments 
in the United States.296 Access to information is a necessary element in allowing stakeholders to 
be informed about the nature of the government’s action, which is critical in mounting potential 
legal challenges.297 
To be meaningful, public participation must also be conducted at a time in regulatory 
process where the underlying action and eventual result can still be influenced.298 Achieving 
better results is in itself a core component underlying why public participation is important to 
environmental decision-making. While stakeholders impacted by Belo Monte have exercised 
their right to be heard, participation and dispute resolution mechanisms have not been able to 
impact the underlying process nor the eventual result. This is in stark contrast to dam 
decommission and deconstruction in the United States, where stakeholders have been able to 
intervene at crucial junctures in the dam licensure process to drive meaningful results.299  
Lastly, meaningful public participation requires statutory underpinnings that facilitate 
interaction with lawmakers throughout the regulatory process along with legal enforcement 
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mechanisms when the process itself is inadequate.300 Accountability has significant value in the 
hydropower context, where development projects often have far reaching social, economic and 
environmental impacts. Adjudicatory mechanisms facilitate meaningful participation by allowing 
both the general public and experts to interact with regulators, the development project, and 
ultimately the project’s impacts and externalities. Litigation in the United States has dictated a 
number of results, ranging from the expansion of tribal reserved rights related to hydropower301 
to a court threatening to “run the river” should regulatory decision makers fail to uphold their 
statutory obligations to both the public and the environment.302  
Open and meaningful participation mechanisms in the environmental decision making 
process help foster an informed citizenry, a transparent and accountable government, and overall 
higher quality decision making related to the environment.303 The distinction between public 
participation that is “meaningful” as opposed to public participation that is merely “due” under 
the law will only become more relevant as the social, environmental and economic externalities 
imposed by hydropower projects become a larger consideration in regulatory law and policy.   
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